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11 Conﬂict Diﬀusion Literature List
Tables 1-3 show a list of 90 most widely-cited articles on conﬂict diﬀusion, mentioned in Footnote 1
of the manuscript. To be included, the articles had to be published in a major peer-reviewed political
science journal between 1980 and 2011 and listed in the Web of Science, Social Science Citation
Index and/or Google Scholar. For each article, we indicate its level of analysis (cross-national or
subnational) and the type of conﬂict analyzed (interstate war, civil war and insurgency, terrorism,
revolutions and protests). The list excludes disaggregated studies of conﬂict, which do not directly
address the question of how violence spreads (e.g. Kalyvas 2006, Lyall 2009).
Of the 90 articles, 77 are on the cross-national level and only indirectly address the dynamics of
state responses to insurgency. Of 13 subnational studies on the list, 7 disaggregate conﬂict events by
combatant (Saxton 2005; Saxton and Benson 2008; Townsley et al. 2008; O’Loughlin and Witmer
2011; O’Loughlin et al. 2010a, b, O’Loughlin et al. 2011). None explores state coercion directly.
Table 1: Conﬂict Diﬀusion Literature (part 1 of 3)
Year Article Level of Analysis Type of Conﬂict
2011 De Groot (2011) Cross-National Ethnic Conﬂict
2011 Kathman (2011) Cross-National Civil War and Insurgency
2011 Murdie and Bhasin (2011) Cross-National Revolutions and Protests
2011 O’Loughlin et al. (2011) Sub-National Civil War and Insurgency
2011 O’Loughlin and Witmer (2011) Sub-National Civil War and Insurgency
2011 Rasler and Thompson (2011) Cross-National Interstate War
2011 Schutte and Weidmann (2011) Sub-National Civil War and Insurgency
2011 Vasquez et al. (2011) Cross-National Interstate War
2010 Braithwaite (2010b) Cross-National Civil War and Insurgency
2010 Braithwaite (2010a) Cross-National Interstate War
2010 Bunce and Wolchik (2010) Cross-National Revolutions and Protests
2010 Kathman (2010) Cross-National Civil War and Insurgency
2010 Neumayer and Plumper (2010) Cross-National Terrorism
2010 O’Loughlin et al. (2010)a Sub-National Civil War and Insurgency
2010 O’Loughlin et al. (2010)b Sub-National Civil War and Insurgency
2010 Raleigh et al. (2010) Sub-National Civil War and Insurgency
2010 Reed and Chiba (2010) Cross-National Interstate War
2010 Weidmann and Toft (2010) Sub-National Civil War and Insurgency
2010 Weidmann and Ward (2010) Sub-National Civil War and Insurgency
2010 Weyland (2010) Cross-National Revolutions and Protests
2009 Cederman et al. (2009) Cross-National Ethnic Conﬂict
2009 Cederman et al. (2009) Cross-National Ethnic Conﬂict
2009 Gartzke and Jo (2009) Cross-National Interstate War
2009 Raleigh and Hegre (2009) Sub-National Civil War and Insurgency
2009 Weidmann (2009) Cross-National Ethnic Conﬂict
2009 Weyland (2009) Cross-National Revolutions and Protests
2009 Wimmer et al. (2009) Cross-National Ethnic Conﬂict
2Table 2: Conﬂict Diﬀusion Literature (part 2 of 3)
Year Article Level of Analysis Type of Conﬂict
2008 Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008) Cross-National Civil War and Insurgency
2008 De Soysa and Neumayer (2008) Cross-National Civil War and Insurgency
2008 Forsberg (2008) Cross-National Ethnic Conﬂict
2008 Iqbal and Starr (2008) Cross-National Civil War and Insurgency
2008 Salehyan (2008b) Cross-National Civil War and Insurgency
2008 Salehyan (2008a) Cross-National Civil War and Insurgency
2008 Saxton and Benson (2008) Cross-National Revolutions and Protests
2008 Townsley et al. (2008) Sub-National Civil War and Insurgency
2008 Urdal (2008) Sub-National Civil War and Insurgency
2008 Way (2008) Cross-National Revolutions and Protests
2007 Beissinger (2007) Cross-National Revolutions and Protests
2007 Braithwaite and Li (2007) Cross-National Terrorism
2007 Gleditsch (2007) Cross-National Civil War and Insurgency
2007 Ward et al. (2007) Cross-National Interstate War
2007 Ward and Hoﬀ (2007) Cross-National Interstate War
2006 Beck et al. (2006) Cross-National Interstate War
2006 Braithwaite (2006) Cross-National Interstate War
2006 Braumoeller (2006) Cross-National Interstate War
2006 Dorussen (2006) Cross-National Interstate War
2006 Furlong et al. (2006) Cross-National Interstate War
2006 Hegre and Sambanis (2006) Cross-National Civil War and Insurgency
2006 Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) Cross-National Civil War and Insurgency
2005 Braithwaite (2005) Cross-National Interstate War
2005 Saxton (2005) Sub-National Revolutions and Protests
2005 Senese (2005) Cross-National Interstate War
2005 Starr (2005) Cross-National Interstate War
2005 Starr and Thomas (2005) Cross-National Interstate War
2005 Tir (2005) Cross-National Interstate War
2004 Fox (2004) Cross-National Ethnic Conﬂict
2003 Furlong and Gleditsch (2003) Cross-National Interstate War
2003 Leeds (2003b) Cross-National Interstate War
2003 Leeds (2003a) Cross-National Interstate War
2003 Starr (2003) Cross-National Interstate War
3Table 3: Conﬂict Diﬀusion Literature (part 3 of 3)
Year Article Level of Analysis Type of Conﬂict
2002 Hammarstrom and Heldt (2002) Cross-National Interstate War
2002 Starr (2002) Cross-National Interstate War
2002 Starr and Thomas (2002) Cross-National Interstate War
2002 Ward and Gleditsch (2002) Cross-National Interstate War
2001 Cederman (2001) Cross-National Interstate War
2001 Gleditsch and Ward (2001) Cross-National Interstate War
2001 Hegre et al. (2001) Cross-National Civil War and Insurgency
2001 Oneal and Russett (2001) Cross-National Interstate War
2000 Bonneuil and Auriat (2000) Cross-National Revolutions and Protests
2000 Gleditsch and Ward (2000) Cross-National Interstate War
2000 Rasler and Thompson (2000) Cross-National Interstate War
1999 Reising (1999) Cross-National Revolutions and Protests
1998 Dudley and Miller (1998) Cross-National Revolutions and Protests
1998 Enterline (1998a) Cross-National Interstate War
1998 Enterline (1998b) Cross-National Interstate War
1998 Kadera (1998) Cross-National Civil War and Insurgency
1998 Simowitz (1998) Cross-National Interstate War
1998 Simowitz and Sheﬀer (1998) Cross-National Interstate War
1998 Starr and Siverson (1998) Cross-National Interstate War
1997 Raknerud and Hegre (1997) Cross-National Interstate War
1995 Carment and James (1995) Cross-National Ethnic Conﬂict
1994 Hammarstrom (1994) Cross-National Interstate War
1993 Gurr (1993) Cross-National Civil War and Insurgency
1991 O’Loughlin and Anselin (1991) Cross-National Interstate War
1990 Most and Starr (1990) Cross-National Interstate War
1990 Siverson and Starr (1990) Cross-National Interstate War
1985 Starr and Most (1985) Cross-National Interstate War
1983 Starr and Most (1983) Cross-National Interstate War
1982 Bremer (1982) Cross-National Interstate War
1980 Most and Starr (1980) Cross-National Interstate War
42 The Epidemic Model
2.1 Proof of the stability of equilibrium solutions
Recall that the epidemic model of conﬂict diﬀusion and containment is represented by the following
system of diﬀerential equations:
_ V = (   d)V C   ( + p)V (1)
_ C =  (   d)V C + ( + p)V (2)
where
 V = proportion of units experiencing insurgent violence at t,
 C = proportion of units experiencing no violence at t,
 _ V ; _ C = time derivatives of V;C,
  = rate of transmissibility in the absence of denial,
  = rate of recovery in the absence of punishment,
 d = oﬀsetting impact of denial on transmissibility,
 p = oﬀsetting impact of punishment on recovery.
The system can be solved for the following equilibria
(non-violent equilibrium) Veq = 0 Ceq = 1 (3)
(violent equilibrium) Veq = 1  
 + p
   d
Ceq =
 + p
   d
(4)
The Jacobian matrix of the system is
J =

 ( + p) + (   d)C (   d)V
( + p)   (   d)C  (   d)V

(5)
We also deﬁne the basic reproduction number R0
R0 =
   d
 + p
(6)
The equilibria in (3, 4) are neutrally stable if det(J)  0 and tr(J)  0, when J is evaluated at
the corresponding equilibrium values of V and C. The stability condition holds for the non-violent
equilibrium as long as  + p >    d (or R0 < 1), and for the violent equilibrium as long as
 + p <    d (or R0 > 1).
52.2 Derivation of empirical R0 statistic
We now derive an empirical estimate for the basic reproduction number in (6). Consider a stochastic
version of the epidemic model in (1,2). As before, units transition between two mutually exclusive
states: violence (V ) and non-violence (C). At each time step, a non-violent unit becomes violent
with probability Pr(V jC) or remains non-violent with probability Pr(CjC) = 1   Pr(V jC); a vio-
lent unit will experience renewed hostilities with probability Pr(V jV ) or transition to non-violence
with probability Pr(CjV ) = 1   Pr(V jV ).1
These probabilities can be used to ﬁnd a discrete-time approximation to the transmissibility and
recovery parameters ; and the oﬀsetting impact of government countermeasures d;p. Following
Mode and Sleeman (2000), we assume that the time length a unit spends in each state is exponen-
tially distributed, with rates speciﬁc to each state. The probability of staying in the non-violent
state C depends on the transmissibility rate , the denial actions taken by the government d and
the initial proportion of violent units in the system V0 (a scalar), while the probability of staying
in a violent state depends only on the recovery rate  and punishment actions p.
Prit(V jV ) = exp
 
  (it + pit)

Prit(CjV ) = 1   exp
 
  (it + pit)

(7)
Prit(V jC) = 1   exp
 
  (it   dit)V0

Prit(CjV ) = 1   exp
 
  (it   dit)V0

These equations are solved to ﬁnd an estimate of the reproduction number R0,
^ R0 = V  1
0
ln
 
Pr(CjC)

ln
 
Pr(V jV )
 (8)
/ logPr(V jV ) Pr(CjC)
where Pr(C|C) is the mean predicted probability of continuing non-violence and Pr(V|V) is the
mean predicted probability of continuing insurgent violence.
2.3 Empirical model: Markov Chain with spatial spline
We now describe the statistical model used to ﬁt the regressions and calculate the transition prob-
abilities in (7) and (8). Following Amemiya (1985) and Jackman (2000), a logit link function was
used to estimate the transition probabilities reported in the paper. The probability that a peaceful
village i transitions to violence between times t and t + 1 is expressed as
Pri;t(CjV ) = Pr(yi;t+1 = 1jyi;t = 0;xi;t) = logit 1(xi;tC) (9)
and the probability that a violent village remains violent is
Pri;t(V jV ) = Pr(yi;t+1 = 1jyi;t = 1;xi;t) = logit 1(xi;tV ) (10)
1At the unit level, these probabilities take the form of individual Bernoulli trials, which most conventional stochas-
tic epidemic models like Greenwood and Reed-Frost assume to be independent and identical for all units and time
periods. We loosen these assumptions here due to the interdependent and highly variable nature of political violence
– some villages may be more likely to transition than others due to a host of regional and local risk factors. The
quantities of interest thus change from population-level transition probabilities Pr() to Prit(), where i indexes the
spatial unit and t indexes the time step.
6where yi;t = 1 indicates that location i is experiencing insurgent violence at time t, and yi;t = 0
otherwise. C and V are sets of regression coeﬃcients that capture the conditional eﬀects of the
covariates x under the two possible current states. These equations are reduced to
Pri;t(V ) = Pr(yi;t+1 = 1jxi;t) = logit 1(xi;tC + yi;txi;t) (11)
where V = C +. Finally, the expression in (5) is used as the parametric portion of a GAM model
Pri;t(V ) = logit 1 
xi;tC + yi;txi;t + f(Longi;Lati)

(12)
where f(Longi;Lati) is a thin-plate regression spline of the geographic coordinates of village i.
GAMs assume that the mean of the dependent variable (E[Yi;t] = i;t) depends on an additive
predictor through a link function g(i;t), and that the linear predictor can include parametric model
components and an unknown nonparametric smooth function f():
E[Yi;t] = i;t = g 1(X0
i;t + f(Longi;Lati)

(13)
where X
i;t is the i;tth row of the model matrix for the strictly parametric model components, and
f(Longi;Lati) is a thin-plate regression spline of the geographic coordinates of village i.
Thin-plate splines (Duchon, 1977; Wood, 2003) estimate f by minimizing
jjy   fjj + Jmd(f) (14)
where y is a vector of yi’s, f = jf(x1);:::;f(xn)j0, x is an n  d matrix of predictors (in this
case, longitude and latitude), jj:jj is the Euclidean norm,  is a smoothing parameter, and Jmd is a
“wiggliness penalty” for f, deﬁned as
Jmd =
Z
:::
Z
Rd
X
1++d=m
m!
1!:::d!
 
@mf
@x
1
1 :::@x
d
d
!2
dx1 :::dxd (15)
where m is the order of diﬀerentiation, satisfying 2m > d. In the two predictor case, the wiggliness
penalty becomes
J22 =
Z Z  @2f
@Long2
2
+ 2
 @2f
@Long2@Lat2
2
+
 @2f
@Lat2
2
dLongdLat (16)
When  = 0, the expression in (2) can be treated as a pure regression spline. When  6= 0, the
expression becomes a penalized regression spline.  also governs the model degrees of freedom, and
can be selected with criteria like generalized cross-validation or the Akaike information criterion
(AIC).
The advantage of thin-plate regression splines is that they avoid the knot placement problems of
conventional regression spline modeling, thus reducing the subjectivity of the model ﬁtting process.
They also nest smooths of lower rank within smooths of higher rank. GAM models can be estimated
in R using the mgcv package developed by Simon Wood. See Wood (2006) for a detailed discussion
of this class of models.
73 North Caucasus Violence Dataset
We use a new dataset of violent incidents in the Russian North Caucasus. The panel dataset is based
on monthly observations across 7,584 municipalities in the seven autonomous republics of the North
Caucasus, and two adjacent regions (oblasts).2 The sample of villages and towns is universal, encom-
passing all populated places within these regions, as listed in the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency’s GEOnet Names Server (GNS). For each month between July 2000 and December 2008, the
incidence and number of violent events in each village were measured through automated text min-
ing of the independent Memorial Group’s “Hronika nasiliya [Chronicle of Violence]” event summaries
(Memorial, 2009). Fuzzy string matching was used to geocode these violent events to the munici-
palities in sample, so as to account for alternate spellings in Russian and a host of local languages.
The dataset includes micro-level information on the dates, geographic coordinates, participants, and
casualties of episodes of political violence and other forms of unrest distributed across these villages
and towns. To capture the connective topology of the study region, a dynamic network dataset
was created, with individual villages as the units (or nodes, in network analysis terms), and road
distances as the connections (or edges) between them. The following appendix provides a descrip-
tion of the data collection strategy, coding rules, dynamic road network estimation, aggregation and
summary statistics.
3.1 Automated event coding
A few words are in order about the data collection strategy and selection criteria used in support
of our analysis. Since the original Memorial data are in raw text format, automated text analysis
was used to mine the Memorial timeline for the dates, locations, actors involved, casualty tolls, and
types of incidents. The data extraction strategy we employed diﬀers from traditional automated
approaches in several ways. First, dictionary-based event coding algorithms typically use parsing
techniques or pattern recognition to code incidents in a “who-does-what-to-whom” format, of which
category typologies like VRA and TABARI are prime examples (Schrodt and Gerner, 1994; Schrodt,
2001; Gerner et al., 2002; King and Lowe, 2003; Shellman, 2008). We opted for a somewhat simpler
approach based on Boolean association rules and indexing algorithms (Han and Kamber 2001, 230-
236; Kim et al. 2001). While not appropriate for all applications, this approach is far more eﬃcient
for data-mining highly structured event summaries of the sort that comprise the Memorial timeline
– where all entries are of approximately the same length (1-2 sentences) and content (date, location,
what happenned, who was involved). Second, while various studies have shown that reliance on a
single news source in events data analysis can mask important inferences and diﬀerences in media
reporting, most previous uses of events data have relied on only one news source (Reeves et al.,
2006; Davenport and Stam, 2006; Davenport and Ball, 2002). The advantage of Memorial’s event
summaries is that they compile daily reports from international news wires, Russian state and local
newspapers, news websites, radio and television broadcasts, and independent reporters, permitting
a diverse approach to corpus building which reduces the risk of reporting bias.3
2In alphabetical order, the republics are Adygea, Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria,
Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, and North Ossetia. The two oblasts are Krasnodar Kray and Stavropol Kray. The dataset
includes 7,584 villages 102 months = 773,568 village-month observations.
3A natural concern with this, like all disaggregated events datasets, is that media are more likely to report incidents
located in accessible areas (Raleigh and Hegre, 2009, 234). This problem is addressed somewhat by Memorial’s reliance
on reports from human rights observers and local independent sources – who beneﬁt from greater access to isolated
areas than mass media organization with relatively few local ties.
8From these raw data, the Text Mining (tm) package in the R statistical language was used to
assemble a corpus of 38,789 text documents, perform natural language processing (removing word
order and Russian stop words) and create a document-term matrix (Feinerer, 2008; Feinerer et al.,
2008). Two custom dictionaries were used to code events and automatically georeference them
against the U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency’s database of 7,584 municipalities (i.e.
cities, towns, villages, and populated places) in the seven North Caucasus Republics (Dagestan,
Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkesiya, Adygea) and
two adjacent majority Russian regions (Stavropol’skiy Kray and Krasnodarskiy Kray).
Of the 38,789 records in Memorial’s timeline, 9,953 were reports of a historical nature, press
statements, and other entries not addressing speciﬁc incidents of violence or their geographical
locations. Of the remaining 28,836, we were able to geocode 73% at the municipality level, 6%
at the rayon (district) level and 21% at the oblast (province) level. In all, 21,050 unique events
were geocoded for 7,584 municipalities between January 2000 and September 2009, representing
as close to a universal sample of state and nonstate violence in Russia as open sources currently
permit – compared with just 925 Russian events for the entire post-Soviet period in the Global
Terrorism Database (LaFree and Dugan, 2007) and 14,177 events in the North Caucasus data
collected by ? and O’Loughlin et al. (2011). The near-universal coverage of the data permits a
“whole” network design, with boundary speciﬁcation deﬁned only by the administrative borders of
the nine southern Russian regions. Because the Memorial event summaries are updated both in
real time and retroactively, we narrowed the period of observation to the months for which the
journalistic record is relatively complete: July 2000 - December 2008.
3.2 Event coding rules
Insurgent violence: Event must involve at least one of the following actors: nonstate armed
groups (NVF), deﬁned by Russian law as any armed group, militia, guerilla or terrorist orga-
nization, formed outside the frameworks of existing laws and operating outside the command
and control structure of the Russian state; and at least one of the following actions: terrorist
attack, hostage-taking, ﬁreﬁght, bombing, ambush, hit and run attack. Deﬁnition does not
include events initiated by government forces and non-political acts of violence – such as those
resulting from unambiguously criminal activity like burglary and armed robbery.
Example: V noq~ na 29 in v s. Elistani Vedenskogo ra@ iona Qeqen-
sko@ i Respubliki voxel otrd boevikov do 70 qelovek. Oni obstrelli
mesto dislokacii roty batal~ona g, a tak e mesto dislokacii POM
poselkovogo otdela milicii, kotory@ i sostoit iz sotrudnikov milicii,
prikomandirovannyh iz drugih regionov RF. Boeviki ubili voditel
glavy administracii Vedenskogo ra@ iona, mestnogo itel. Ego vyveli
iz doma i zastrelili na ulice. Take byla obstrelna maxina s sotrud-
nikami batal~ona g, kotorye ehali iz s. Agixbato@ i v s. Elistani.
V rezultate pogib sotrudnik batal~ona. K utru boeviki uxli iz sela.
Translation: On the night of 29 July a detachment of up to 70 insurgents entered
the village of Elistanzhi, Venedo district, Chechen Republic. They opened ﬁre on
the positions of a company of the “Yug" Battalion, as well as the positions of the
municipal police department, which consists of police oﬃcers dispatched from other
9regions of the Russian Federation. The insurgents killed the driver of the head of
Vedeno District, a local resident. He was taken from his home and shot on the
street. A car with “Yug” Battalion personnel also came under ﬁre, as it was driving
from Agishbatoy village to Elistanzhi. As a result one serviceman was killed. By
morning the insurgents had left the village. [Event ID: 34117; Date: 20080629]
Kinetic Operations (punishment): Event must involve at least one of the following actors:
Russian Armed Forces, Federal Security Services, Special Forces, Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs,
local police, local administration, federal administration; and at least one of the following
actions: search and destroy missions, artillery strikes, air strikes, raids, any incidents of gov-
ernment violence that took place as part of a “counterterrorist operation” (KTO), deﬁned
in Russian law as a “combination of special-purpose combat operations and other measures
involving military hardware, weapons and special means to prevent terrorist acts, neutral-
ize terrorists, provide physical security to persons and facilities, as well as to minimize the
consequences of terrorist actions.”
Example: 5 fevral posle 9.00 po s. Alhan-Kala Groznenskogo ra@ iona
nanesen artilleri@ iski@ i udar. S razliqno@ i stepen~ intensivnosti snardy
rvalis~ na territorii naselennogo punkta ne menee dvuh qasov. V rezul~tate
artobstrela raneny xest~ qelovek. V vostoqno@ i qasti sela, neposred-
stvenno primykaxhe@ i k g. Groznomu, byli povredeny bolee desti
domov.
Translation: On 5 February after 9:00 an artillery strike was carried out on the
village Alkhan-Kala, Groznenskiy district. With varying degrees of intensity, muni-
tions continued to explode over the population center for no less than two hours. As
a result of the artillery strike, six people were wounded. In the eastern section of the
village, immediately adjacent to the city of Grozny, over ten homes were damaged.
[Event ID: 1075; Date: 20010205]
Cordon Operations (denial): Event must involve at least one of the following actors: Russian
Armed Forces, Federal Security Services, Special Forces, Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs, local
police, local administration, federal administration; and at least one of the following ac-
tions: eﬀorts to physically disrupt lines of communication connecting a municipality to other
locations in the region. This deﬁnition goes beyond routine road obstructions like vehicle
checkpoints; it includes only larger-scale operations such as government eﬀorts to establish a
cordon around a whole village or town.
Example: Gruppa boevikov blokirovana v gorode Dagestanskie Ogni, soob-
wil operativny@ i deurny@ i MVD respubliki.
Translation: A group of insurgents is blocked in the city of Dagestanskie Ogni,
according to the republican Interior Ministry’s operations duty oﬃcer. [Event ID:
31428; Date: 20080327]
Cordon and Search Operations (denial + punishment): At the event level, the “Kinetic”
and “Cordon” variables were coded in a mutually exclusive way from, such that no denial event
10included an action where local kinetic operations were reported to have also taken place. If
both types of events were observed, the resulting interaction between the two strategy choices
was called denial + punishment.
Example: Mnogoqislenna gruppirovka silovyh struktur, vklqa voen-
nosluawih Ministerstva oborony, blokirovala st. Voznesenovska
Malgobekskogo ra@ iona Respubliki Inguxeti. V stanice naqalas~ zaqistka.
Translation: A large grouping of security forces, including personnel from the Min-
istry of Defense, has blocked the village of Voznesenovskaya, Malgobek district,
Republic of Ingushetia. A mop-up operation has begun in the village. [Event ID:
23472; Date: 20070422]
3.3 Reliability of automated event coding
The reliability of content analysis as a data collection method can be separated into three compo-
nents: (1) consistency, (2) replicability, and (3) accuracy (Weber, 1990, 17). While previous events
datasets for the North Caucasus have relied on hand-coding of newspaper articles and incident re-
ports (Lyall, 2009, 2010), there are several advantages to the automated approach employed here.
Foremost among these advantages are consistency and replicability – both of which will be critical
if the epidemic model is to be meaningfully extended to other cases. Hand-coded event data collec-
tion is extremely labor-intensive, involving months of tedious and painstaking work by large teams
of undergraduate research assistants (King and Lowe, 2003, 618). Even with experienced coders
following well-deﬁned tasks and classiﬁcation rules, inter-coder reliability can be notoriously low
(Mikhaylov and Benoit, 2008). Humans have limited working memories and tend to rely on heuris-
tics, resulting in informal, subjective and ad hoc decisions, not to mention broader risks associated
with fatigue, inattention and prior knowledge of hypotheses (Grimmer and King, 2009, 4-5).
Automated coding is no panacea; it also requires a deep working knowledge of the subject mat-
ter in the construction of coding rules, and a considerable – though nowhere near as onerous –
time investment in data collection, pre-processing and programming. Once these coding rules are
established, however, the consistency of machine coding becomes 100% since the program is exe-
cuting a ﬁxed algorithm (Schrodt and Gerner, 1994). The replicability of the codings across two
or more machines – given the same set of rules, actor/action dictionary and corpus of texts – is
similarly high. Further, automated coding is not subject to errors induced by the context of an
event, political or cultural biases, fatigue or boredom.
Automated coding methods have been shown to produce results at least as accurate as hand
coding but with complete consistency, replicability and more randomness in the errors (Schrodt
and Gerner, 1994; King and Lowe, 2003). Whereas bias in the errors can create bias in the results,
randomness in errors will tend to attenuate the results, not improve them. The Boolean matching
approach uses in this paper capitalizes on the highly structured form of the coded texts – short,
two-three sentence incident reports, which have a limited vocabulary and narrow substantive focus.
Methods like TABARI and VRA Reader assume little to no structure in the text, thereby opening
themselves to additional sources of error. If the assumptions about the nature of the texts are
correct, the Boolean matching approach is likely not only to match the coding accuracy of TABARI
and VRA Reader but actually exceed it.
The most common types of inaccurate codings in automated events extraction (i.e.: incorrect
11dates, geocodings or event types) usually occur due to unusually-structured sentences, unrecognized
terms not included in the dictionary, or references to historical events (Schrodt, 2001). The ﬁrst of
these was addressed in part by selecting the highly-structured Memorial event summaries as the text
corpus (see examples above). The second problem, usually induced through the use of oﬀ-the-shelf
coding dictionaries, was addressed in the dictionary design phase. Rather than use a pre-existing
list of terms that may or may not be in the text, we adopted an ex-post dictionary construction
technique, in which the system generated a list of most-frequent terms (and permutations thereof)
included in the Memorial summaries, and the dictionary lists of relevant political actors, actions,
targets and place names were constructed based on this list.4 This approach enables the ﬁne-tuning
of coding rules to the substantive domain of the texts, informed by prior knowledge of what sorts
of events can be coded accurately.
While the approach taken here was designed to avoid many of the systematic sources of bias
and error common to human coding and certain categories of automated coding, we performed a
series of checks to assess the accuracy of the automated event codings and matchings to geographic
place names and dates. The ﬁrst of these was to examine the face validity of the data: does the
spatio-temporal distribution of the coded events align with narrative accounts of the evolution of
the Caucasus conﬂict during the period in question (2000-2008). Most analysts of the region –
Russian and Western, qualitative and quantitative – have described an increasingly diﬀuse pattern
of violence. A conﬂict which, until the consolidation of power in Chechnya by the Kadyrov family
in 2004-2005, was largely limited to Chechnya, has in recent years spread to neighboring regions,
particularly Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria (Malashenko and Trenin, 2002; Kramer,
2004, 2005; Sagramoso, 2007; Souleimanov, 2007; Vendina et al., 2007; ?; Kuchins et al., 2011). As
shown in Figures 1-4, our data largely support these narratives. In 2000-2002, ﬁghting was mostly
conﬁned to the Chechen Republic, with occasional rebel incursions into neighboring republics and
majority-Russian areas, like Stavropol Kray. Following a spike in violence in 2004-2005 (after the
assassination of Akhmat Kadyrov), violent attacks became less frequent, but covered a broader
swath of territory. Attacks in Ingushetia and Dagestan became more common, while Chechnya
became more calm.
An equally important issue was whether some individual events may be mis-coded due to refer-
ences to historical events, odd phrasings or other problems that could be more easily detected and
avoided by a human coder with subject matter expertise. While, due to the many sources error
described above, we should be wary of treating any human codings as a “gold standard,” a basic
comparison of the two types of measures can serve as a useful “sanity check.” With this reasoning,
we performed the following procedure multiple times: a set of 50 event summaries were randomly
selected from the corpus, and hand-coded by one of the co-authors according to their location, date,
and event type. The human event coding rules used were the same as the machine rules outlined in
section 1.2. The human codings were then compared against the automated codings, and the level
of agreement was calculated as the proportion of event summaries where the two sets of codings
were identical. If the level of agreement fell below .9 (more than ﬁve disagreements out of 50), the
set of events was then manually inspected to determine the source of disagreement.
If the source of disagreement was determined to be systematic, we modiﬁed the coding procedure
to ﬂag such potential problems for manual inspection with a dummy variable called “INSPECT.” For
4Due the complexities of Russian grammar, we did not use stemming as part of natural language processing. This
enabled us to distinguish between various grammatical permutations of location and actor names in the construction
of the dictionary.
12instance, in the case of miscodings of paramilitary units’ home bases as locations of events – as
in “Novgorodskiy OMON” – we set INSPECT=1 if a location name was followed or preceded by a
term representing a political actor in an event summary.5 To address historical references directly,
we set INSPECT=1 if more than one date, month or year was mentioned in a summary, or if more
than one location was mentioned in a summary. This procedure also helped us distinguish between
cases where event summaries included references to multiple simultaneous events (e.g. “air strikes
were carried out on March 13 in villages A, B and C”), as opposed to event summaries that made
references to a single current event and one or more historical events (e.g. “an air strike was carried
out on May 15 in village A. This operation marks the ﬁrst series of air strikes in the area since
March 13.”) The goal here was to minimize the risk of double-counts and false positives, while
avoiding false negatives that would result from mistaking multiple events for historical references.
We then performed a manual inspection of all cases where INSPECT=1 (originally, 24% of the
events), and corrected the codings by hand where deemed necessary. We then selected another 50
event summaries at random, and repeated the entire procedure (a total of 7 times) until the level
of agreement exceeded .9 for three consecutive sets of 50. Only after we became convinced that the
accuracy of individual event codings approached those of a human subject matter expert (>.9), did
we aggregate the events to the level of village-month as described in detail below.
4 Road Network Data and Dynamic Spatial Weights Matrix
To model the spread of insurgent violence as a network process, and to formally account for road
obstructions and other denial actions in the connective structure of the conﬂict zone, we measured
the accessibility between populated places with a time-variant origin-destination (OD) matrix Dt,
in which entries dijt are geodesic (i.e.: shortest length in kilometers, if more than one route can be
taken) path distances between places i and j along the local network of roads.6 The resulting spatial
weights matrix was also dynamic (time-variant): if a denial action was reported at municipality i
at time t (BLOCKit = 1), we modiﬁed the matrix to reﬂect that location’s temporary inaccessibility
due to road obstructions – eﬀectively treating the municipality as a geographic isolate with no
road connections heading in or out. To account for the diﬃculty experienced by insurgents, as
they attempt to break through the government cordon and expand operations to other towns, the
resulting matrix cells dijt were then assigned the maximum road distance in the region.
OD matrices have been the subject of a vast literature in urban planning and transportation
engineering,7 but have not – to our knowledge – been widely used in political geography, despite
the many advantages of network relative to Euclidean distance. Although the calculation of road
network distances is far more computationally intensive than their planar counterparts, OD matrices
can be estimated with Python scripts, Java programs or ArcGIS extensions (Steenberghen et al.,
2009). For these data, we used a geoprocessing script which relies on ArcMap’s Network Analyst
engine.8 The result is a dense 7;584  7;584 matrix, with 57,517,056 shortest-path road distances
5This procedure was performed through string operations on the original text, rather than the “bag of words”
representation of the text following the removal of stop words and the discarding of word order.
6Geospatial data on the road network in the Caucasus, as well as other spatial data of interest (population density,
elevation, land cover), were taken from the U.S. Geological Survey’s Global GIS Database (Hearn et al., 2005)
7See Cherkassky et al. (1996); Zhan and Noon (1998)
8In OD matrix estimation, villages located beyond 5 km of a major road were initially treated as isolates. In these
cases, we calculated the Euclidean distance to the nearest municipality accessible by road, and used the sum of this
statistic and the nearest-on-road-village’s distance data as the oﬀ-road municipality’s road distance data.
13between villages.
Valued network data are often dichotomized for ease of interpretation (by distinguishing between
neighbors and non-neighbors) and computational eﬃciency (the valued matrix is over 3GB in size).
However, dichotomization also risks the loss of potentially important information (Thomas and
Blitzstein, 2009). Because the epidemiological model assumes continuous measures of network
distance, we avoided the use of dichotomizing cutpoints and preserved the continuous distance
data. A visual representation of the road network structure is provided in Figure 5.
5 Coding Rules for Aggregated Data
5.1 Geographic locations and dates
Case ID (municipality-month) (TSID) Unique identiﬁer for municipality-month observation.
Use for sorting data, creation of time lags.
Case ID (month-municipality) (TSID2) Unique identiﬁer for month-municipality observation.
Use for sorting data, creation of spatial lags.
Time ID (month) (TID) Unique identiﬁer for each month.
Date (YRMO) Date of observation, in format YYYYMM.
Place ID (CID) Unique identiﬁer for city, town, village or populated place.
Place Name (NAME) Name of city, town, village or populated place, from GeoNames (2009).
Region ID (OBLAST_ID) Unique identiﬁer for region (oblast).
Region Name (OBLAST_NAME) Name of region (oblast).
District ID (RID) Unique identiﬁer for district (rayon).
District Name (RAYON_NAME) Name of district (rayon).
Latitude (LAT) Use UTM 38N or UTM 39N for projected coordinate system, WGS84 for geo-
graphic coordinate system.
Longitude (LONG) Use UTM 38N or UTM 39N for projected coordinate system, WGS84 for geo-
graphic coordinate system.
5.2 Conﬂict dynamics
Dependent Variable
Insurgent attack (count) (REBEL) number of episodes of insurgent violence, as deﬁned above,
observed in municipality i during month t.
Insurgent attack (binary) (REBEL_b)
8
<
:
1 if at least one episode of insurgent violence was
observed in village i during month t
0 otherwise
14Insurgent attack (count, time lagged) (L_REBEL) number of episodes of insurgent violence, as
deﬁned above, observed in municipality i during month t   1.
Insurgent attack (binary, time lagged) (L_REBEL_b)
8
<
:
1 if at least one episode of insurgent violence
was observed in village i during month t   1
0 otherwise
Punishment Actions
Kinetic operations (count) (SPETZ) number of government-initiated kinetic operations, as de-
ﬁned above, observed in municipality i during month t.
Kinetic operations (binary) (SPETZ_b)
8
<
:
1 if at least one kinetic operation was
observed in village i during month t
0 otherwise
Kinetic operations (count, time lagged) (L_SPETZ) number of government-initiated kinetic op-
erations, as deﬁned above, observed in municipality i during month t   1.
Kinetic operations (binary, time lagged) (L_SPETZ_b)
8
<
:
1 if at least one kinetic operation was
observed in village i during month t   1
0 otherwise
Denial Actions
Cordon operations (count) (BLOCK) number of government-initiated cordon operations, as de-
ﬁned above, observed in municipality i during month t.
Cordon operations (binary) (BLOCK_b)
8
<
:
1 if at least one cordon operation was
observed in village i during month t
0 otherwise
Cordon operations (count, time lagged) (L_BLOCK) number of government-initiated cordon op-
erations, as deﬁned above, observed in municipality i during month t   1.
Cordon operations (binary, time lagged) (L_BLOCK_b)
8
<
:
1 if at least one cordon operation was
observed in village i during month t   1
0 otherwise
Distance to nearest recent insurgent attack (log) (ln_NEAR) natural logarithm of
min(wiInsurgent Violencej6=i;t 1), where wi is a vector of road distances between village i and
all other villages j. Where a denial action (L_BLOCK_b) was reported, we modiﬁed the matrix
W to reﬂect that location’s temporary inaccessibility due to road obstructions – eﬀectively
treating the municipality as a geographic isolate with no road connections heading in or out.
5.3 Control variables
Population density (POP) Population per square kilometer.
Elevation (ELEVATION) In meters. Sea level = 0.
15Slope (SLOPE) Slope of terrain at municipality’s location, in degrees. Zero represents ﬂat terrain;
90 represents a vertical slope.
Unemployment (UNEMPLOY) Members of a region’s working-age population (15-72 yrs.) without
employment at t   1 (thousands)
Distance to military base (log) (ln_DMIL) natural logarithm of dik, the road distance (in kilo-
meters) between village i and military facility k
Regional capital (CAPITAL)

1 if municipality i is a republican or oblast capital
0 otherwise
5.4 Interactions (pre-coded for transitional model)
Insurgent Attack  Kinetic Op (I_SPETZ)
8
> > <
> > :
L_SPETZ_b if at least one episode of insurgent
violence was observed in village i
during month t   1
0 otherwise
Insurgent Attack  Population Density (I_POP)
8
> > <
> > :
POP if at least one episode of insurgent
violence was observed in village i
during month t   1
0 otherwise
Insurgent Attack  Elevation (I_ELEVATION)
8
> > <
> > :
ELEVATION if at least one episode of insurgent
violence was observed in village i
during month t   1
0 otherwise
Insurgent Attack  Slope (I_SLOPE)
8
> > <
> > :
SLOPE if at least one episode of insurgent
violence was observed in village i
during month t   1
0 otherwise
Insurgent Attack  Dist. to Nearest Attack (I_ln_NEAR)
8
> > <
> > :
ln_NEAR if at least one episode of
insurgent violence was observed
in village i during month t   1
0 otherwise
Insurgent Attack  Dist. to Nearest Base (I_ln_DMIL)
8
> > <
> > :
ln_DMIL if at least one episode of
insurgent violence was observed
in village i during month t   1
0 otherwise
Insurgent Attack  Regional Capital (I_CAPITAL)
8
> > <
> > :
CAPITAL if at least one episode of insurgent
violence was observed in village i
during month t   1
0 otherwise
16Insurgent Attack  Unemployment I_L_UNEMPLOY)
8
> > <
> > :
L_UNEMPLOY if at least one episode of insurgent
violence was observed in village i
during month t   1
0 otherwise
176 Summary Statistics
Table 4: Summary statistics for aggregated data (village-month level) and list of sources
Variable Description Variable Name Min Median Mean Max Source
Insurgent Attack (count) REBEL 0 0 0.0041 46 GeoNames (2009); Memorial (2009)
Insurgent Attack (count, time lagged) L_REBEL 0 0 0.0042 46 GeoNames (2009); Memorial (2009)
Insurgent Attack (binary) REBEL_b 0 0 0.0023 1 GeoNames (2009); Memorial (2009)
Insurgent Attack (binary, time lagged) L_REBEL_b 0 0 0.0024 1 GeoNames (2009); Memorial (2009)
Kinetic Operations (count) SPETZ 0 0 0.0019 31 GeoNames (2009); Memorial (2009)
Kinetic Operations (count, time lagged) L_SPETZ 0 0 0.0020 31 GeoNames (2009); Memorial (2009)
Kinetic Operations (binary) SPETZ_b 0 0 0.0011 1 GeoNames (2009); Memorial (2009)
Kinetic Operations (binary, time lagged) L_SPETZ_b 0 0 0.0011 1 GeoNames (2009); Memorial (2009)
Blocking (count) BLOCK 0 0 0.0004 5 GeoNames (2009); Memorial (2009)
Blocking (count, time lagged) L_BLOCK 0 0 0.0004 5 GeoNames (2009); Memorial (2009)
Blocking (binary) BLOCK_b 0 0 0.0004 1 GeoNames (2009); Memorial (2009)
Blocking (binary, time lagged) L_BLOCK_b 0 0 0.0004 1 GeoNames (2009); Memorial (2009)
Population Density POP 0 13 166.3 25181 GeoNames (2009); Hearn et al. (2005)
Elevation ELEVATION -31 239 523.1 2818 GeoNames (2009); Hearn et al. (2005)
Slope SLOPE 0 1.1604 3.6733 40.0156 GeoNames (2009); Hearn et al. (2005)
Unemployment UNEMPLOY 1.9 24.9 52.18 376.5 GeoNames (2009); Goskomstat (2009)
Unemployment (time lagged) L_UNEMPLOY 1.9 24.6 52.08 376.5 GeoNames (2009); Goskomstat (2009)
Road Distance to Nearest Attack (log) ln_NEAR 0 5.024 4.97 7.139 GeoNames (2009); Goskomstat (2009)
Distance to Nearest Military Base (log) ln_DMIL 0.0065 4.0343 3.8717 5.3435 GeoNames (2009); Janko (2009); Hearn et al. (2005)
Regional Capital CAPITAL 0 0 0.0012 1 GeoNames (2009)
Insurgent Attack  Kinetic Op I_SPETZ 0 0 0.0004 1 GeoNames (2009); Memorial (2009)
Insurgent Attack  Population Density I_POP 0 0 3.39 11576 GeoNames (2009); Memorial (2009)
Insurgent Attack  Elevation I_ELEVATION -27 0 0.8217 2146 GeoNames (2009); Hearn et al. (2005)
Insurgent Attack  Slope I_SLOPE 0 0 0.0053 24.18 GeoNames (2009); Hearn et al. (2005)
Insurgent Attack  Dist. to Nearest Attack I_ln_NEAR 0 0 0.0010 7.139 GeoNames (2009); Hearn et al. (2005)
Insurgent Attack  Dist. to Nearest Base I_ln_DMIL 0 0 0.0075 5.17 GeoNames (2009); Janko (2009); Hearn et al. (2005)
Insurgent Attack  Regional Capital I_CAPITAL 0 0 0.0002 1 GeoNames (2009); Memorial (2009)
Insurgent Attack  Unemployment I_L_UNEMPLOY 0 0 0.4038 376.5 GeoNames (2009); Memorial (2009); Goskomstat (2009)
1
8Table 5: Correlation Matrix
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REBEL 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2
REBEL_b 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
SPETZ 0.6 0.3 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1
SPETZ_b 0.3 0.2 0.7 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1
BLOCK 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 1.0 0.9 0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
BLOCK_b 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.9 1.0 0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
POP 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
ELEVATION -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 1.0 0.8 0.2 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0
SLOPE -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 0.8 1.0 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0
L_UNEMPLOY 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.2 0.2 1.0 -0.5 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
ln_NEAR -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 1.0 0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.0 -0.2
ln_DMIL -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.2 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 1.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0
CAPITAL 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1
I_SPETZ 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.0 0.2 1.0 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
I_POP 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.0 0.2 0.5 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.3
I_ELEVATION 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.8 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.5
I_SLOPE 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.8 1.0 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.5
I_ln_NEAR 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.2
I_ln_DMIL 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.2 1.0 0.1 0.7
I_CAPITAL 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.2
I_L_UNEMPLOY 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.2 1.0
1
9Figure 1: Spatio-temporal distribution of dependent variable (insurgent attacks), July 2000 - Dec 2002
2
0Figure 2: Spatio-temporal distribution of dependent variable (insurgent attacks), Jan 2003 - Jun 2005
2
1Figure 3: Spatio-temporal distribution of dependent variable (insurgent attacks), July 2005 - Dec 2007
2
2Figure 4: Spatio-temporal distribution of dependent variable (insurgent attacks), Jan 2008 - Dec 2008
2
3Figure 5: Road Network
Road Network
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47 Additional Regression Results
Table 6 reports regression results for four additional model, with identical speciﬁcations as in Models 1-4 in the manuscript, apart
from the substitution of slope (in degrees) for elevation (in meters). Results for the slope variable are consistent with those for
elevation: new insurgent violence is more likely in villages in ﬂat, accessible terrain, but the eﬀect is negligible for recurring violence.
Results for all other variables are nearly identical to those in Models 1-4.
Table 6: Markov transition models (estimated with GAM logit). Dependent variable: incidence of insurgent violence in village
i at time t (Vit.
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
C V C V C V C V
Intercept -9.4101 -7.2378 -6.3059 -4.9666 -6.4671 -5.4243 -7.0321 -4.6796
(0.9516)*** (0.9509)*** (0.3376)*** (0.3856)*** (0.3268)*** (0.389)*** (0.3739)*** (0.4812)***
Punishment Actions
Kinetic Ops (t   1) 2.4298 0.7901 2.4132 0.7877 2.3917 0.6427 2.7761 0.5421
(0.1427)*** (0.1641)*** (0.1435)*** (0.1636)*** (0.1444)*** (0.1706)*** (0.1627)*** (0.1976)**
Denial Actions
Road Distance to -0.1459 0.0527 -0.1307 0.0513 -0.1415 0.0341 -0.0968 0.08
Nearest Attack (t   1) (0.0253)*** (0.0386) (0.0251)*** (0.0385) (0.0253)*** (0.041) (0.0315)** (0.044)
Controls
Population Density 4e-04 3e-04 3e-04 3e-04 3e-04 2e-04 3e-04 2e-04
(2e-05)*** (2e-05)*** (2e-05)*** (2e-05)*** (2e-05)*** (2e-05)*** (2e-05)*** (2e-05)***
Slope -0.0868 0.0036 -0.0719 0.0168 -0.0696 0.0222 -0.0843 -0.0587
(0.012)*** (0.0264) (0.0117)*** (0.0253) (0.0118)*** (0.0255) (0.0132)*** (0.0392)
Road Distance to Nearest Mil. Base -0.3746 -0.116 -0.3037 0.0359 -0.2979 0.0042
(0.0373)*** (0.0692) (0.0396)*** (0.076) (0.0438)*** (0.0811)
Regional Capital 1.7649 1.6118 1.8155 1.4349
(0.2074)*** (0.2964)*** (0.2154)*** (0.3063)***
Unemployment (t   1) 0.0034 -3e-04
(5e-04)*** (7e-04)
Spatial Spline f(Long;Lat) EDF: 28.77, 2: 1218.16*** EDF: 26.52, 2: 961.12*** EDF: 26.37, 2: 1138.65*** EDF: 26.73, 2: 472.09***
N 688,315 (in-sample) 688,315 (in-sample) 688,315 (in-sample) 666,529 (in-sample)
77,356 (out-of-sample) 77,356 (out-of-sample) 77,356 (out-of-sample) 77,356 (out-of-sample)
AIC 15,426.50 15,343.97 15,257.1 12,960.76
AUC 0.932 (in-sample) 0.933 (in-sample) 0.934 (in-sample) 0.932 (in-sample)
0.932 (out-of-sample) 0.934 (out-of-sample) 0.934 (out-of-sample) 0.914 (out-of-sample)
Signiﬁcance levels: *p < :05, **p < :01, ***p < :001.
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